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The Sophists

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The Sophists

By Stacy Cacciatore

The readings this week centered on the exploration of the Sophists and the debate regarding if they existed, if they did exist, what did they stand for, and why it matters. Schiappa and Poulakos engage in a fiery debate on the topic of Sophists and they go back in forth in several papers refuting each other’s arguments. Poulakos (1983) strongly believes “…without the Sophists, our picture of the rhetoric that came out of the Greek experience is incomplete”(35)[1]. In his essay, Toward a Sophistic Definition of Rhetoric, Poulakos applauds the Sophists for their contribution to rhetoric and Greek culture and history. He defines the characteristics of the Sophists, who he says, “as a group, the Sophists are known to have been the first to say or do a number of things (44). This presupposes that the Sophists, as a group, have common characteristics. He states, “the ‘sophistic’ definition of rhetoric is founded on and consistent with the notions of rhetoric as art, style as personal expression, the timely, the appropriate, and the possible. This definition posits that man is driven primarily by his desire to be other, the wish to move from the sphere of actuality to that of possibility (45). This is an important statement about the theory of rhetoric that the Sophists developed.

 

Schiappa (1990), however, strongly disagrees. He states that Plato was the first to use the term rhetoric, making it impossible for the Sophists to have clearly conceptualized this term[2]. He provides evidence supporting his claim that there was a lack of attestation of the term in fifth- and fourth-century texts prior to Gorgias. However, Pendrick (1998) found fault in Schiappa’s logic, relating to how he defined rhetoric. He states, “Part of the difficulty with Schiappa’s position is terminological. Following George Kennedy, he distinguishes two senses of the word ‘rhetoric’: (1) persuasive speaking or oratory; and (2) rhetorical theory or “conceptual or meta-rhetoric that attempts to theorize about oratory,” (11)[3]. This rebuttal inserts weakness into Schiappa’s argument. O’Sullivan (1993) also doesn’t agree with Schiappa’s claims that Plato was the first to use the word ‘rhetoric’[4]. He brings up an extremely interesting point, which is that the lack of the word ‘rhetoric’ in 5thcentury texts is not an effective argument, as there is almost a total disappearance of all the writings of the Sophists. As we learned previously, the majority of the work of the Sophists exists in fragments. Therefore, we don’t have a full picture of the terms they used.

 

Schiappa (1990) writes another paper stressing the difference between appreciatingsophistic thinking as a contribution to contemporary theory and developing / reconstructing sophistic theories or doctrines (192)[5]. (As VV would say, the emphasis in italics is mine). Schiappa fires back at Poulakos, saying basically that while many of his works are “praiseworthy examples of neo-sophistic rhetorical criticism”, this back-handed compliment is couched with the caveat that his work requires correction “if viewed from the standpoint of historical reconstruction” (198). He is basically saying that while the work of the Sophists can be appreciated, there is a historically significant difference between the early sophistic efforts, which pontificate theories about the world and how it works, and the later efforts that are a part of clearly conceptualized “art of rhetoric”.  This phrase “art” is also important to note because Poulakos claims that rhetoric = art, but Schiappa states that “art of rhetor” didn’t occur until the 4thcentury. This isn’t the only argument that Schiappa uses in disputing Poulakos’ claims. He also discusses how one cannot classify the Sophists as “highly accomplished linguistic craftsmen” as Poulakos does. Rather, that is how everyone spoke back then…in this rhythmic fashion. Therefore, it’s doesn’t mean anything significant to claim this is a “Sophist style” when in fact, it was the style of the time. Schiappa states that there is no single doctrine of theory of any subject for the Sophists. He then goes out to define the style of each of the Sophists individually, which also becomes a hot button between Schiappa and Poulakos. Poulakos claims that Schiappa is ridiculous for saying that the Sophists can only be studied independently because he is contradicting himself. First, he says that they can’t be defined, then he says, well they can, but they are different. Schiappa (1990) defined the Sophists as follows:

 

  • Protagoras – Dissoi Logoi
  • Gorgias – Logos as Apate
  • Prodicus – Orthoepeia
  • Hippias – Polymathy
  • Antiphon – Logos as Cure or Escape
  • Critias – Logos of Thought
  • Thrasymachus – Logos and Power [6](212)

 

 

Poulakos (1990) then responds back to Schiappa in a journal article, articulating his clear frustration with Schiappa. He states, “Schiappa has no case, if he did have a case it could not be supported and even if it could be supported, it would be useless,” (219)[7]. I had to laugh at this for its’ metaphysical nihilism characteristics. Poulakos comes back strong in this argument, claiming “Schiappa creates false dichotomy between those who know the “facts” (historians and philologists) and those who don’t” (221). He also calls out Schiappa for basing his entire argument on the fact that the term rhetoric can’t be found in the ancient texts because Schiappa didn’t explain how he arrived at those facts (222). Poulakos then provides several artifacts of evidence demonstrate where and when he found the usage of the word ‘rhetoric’, including an Aesop tale from early 6thcentury B.C. He goes on to state that just because Schiappa can’t see the common themes and relationship between the Sophists, doesn’t mean that it doesn’t exist.

 

Schiappa (1990) responds again to Poulakos. He summarizes his previous argument, “Last issue I argued that scholarship concerning Sophists can benefit by acknowledging the difference between historical and rational reconstructions. The former is recovering Sophistic Doctrines based on historical evidence. The latter contributes to construction of a contemporary “neosophistic” theory and criticism of rhetoric” (p 307)[8]. Schiappa called Poulakos’ work “neo-sophistic” because of his “sophistic definition of rhetoric” (p 307). Schiappa stated, “We are all trapped in the present and all “history” is merely a reflection of the historian’s values and biases” (p 307). I completely agree that history is biased and cannot be separated from the historian’s own viewpoints and beliefs. I don’t think it’s conscious, but we are human and I think it’s human nature to filter information through our own experience, similar to what we learned last week in the study on the frog’s brain framing reality based on his biology. I also agree with Schiappa that there is not one single “final” or “objective” or “impersonal” historical account.

 

In Schiappa’s (1991)Sophistic Rhetoric: Oasis or Mirage?He states that Poulakos developed a “sophistic definition of rhetoric” (5)[9]. He also claims that Sophistic rhetoric only exists because we want to see it, it’s just a “mirage” (5). He also believes that it is impossible to come up with a “historically defensible definition of “sophistic rhetoric” that is nontrivial and uniquely valuable,” (5). Not only does Schiappa not believe in “sophistic rhetoric”, he doesn’t believe we even know who they are. He states that the usage of the term “sophist” was loosely defined in ancient times and while Plato denoted a group of individuals in the 5thcentury B.C. (Gorgias, Protagoras, Hippias, Prodicus, Thrasymachus, Critias and Antiphon), the list was arbitrary (7). He states:

 

It is clear that we cannot identify a defining characteristic of “the sophists” that allows us to narrow the group to a degree sufficient to adduce a common perspective or set of practices. Either we treat the term as broadly as did the ancient Greeks, in which case almost every serious thinking must be included, or we are forced to pick a trait that serves no useful function other than to confirm some preconceived preference. Any account of “sophistic rhetoric” will tend to beg the question because it will presuppose who should be called a “sophist” – a determination which must be made on doctrinal grounds. The circularity of the reasoning seems to be unavoidable and is part of the reason “sophistic rhetoric” should be considered a mirage. (p 8)

 

He goes on to say that sophistic rhetoric is largely fiction and superfluous. He also claims that Plato invented sophistic rhetoric for his own needs and we no longer need to maintain this fiction (16). I was shocked when I read this, as this is quite a bold statement. I was confused at the point on Plato creating rhetoric for his own “ends”, as he doesn’t explain what those “ends” are.

 

In our very own Victor Vitanza’s (1991) paper, “Some More” Notes, Toward a “Third” Sophistiche makes the point that there is a third Sophistic. Vitanza posits that the three Sophistics’ are not necessarily sequential. Each have representation, including Protagoras for the first Sophistic, Aeschines for the second Sophistic and Gorgias (among others, including Nietzshe, Lyotard and Foucault) represent the third. Vitanza uses the method of “counting” to differentiate between the three Sophist groups. To summarize, Aristotle counts to “one”, the Sophists count to “two” and Gorgias, et al count to “many things” (p 117)[10]. To further differentiate, Vitanza defines the timeframes for each of the Sophistics:

 

  • Third Sophistic
    • Ethics, politics, aesthetics, so-called unhappy considerations
  • First Sophistic
    • 5thcentury BC
  • Second Sophistic
    • 2ndcentury AD (118)

 

Vitanza (1991) questions, “with whom will I drift” asking the philosophical question of where his philosophical roots reside, which he answers as the third Sophistic (121). He is not only against Platonism, Hegelianism, but also against any form of Aristotelianism. While the notion behind the Platonic/Socratic notion is linked to physis (nature) Sophistic is linked to nomos (law, convention, custom) (123). Lyotard says, “consensus finally does violence to the heterogeneity of language games,” (p 120). Vitanza’s response to this is “[C]onsensus is only a particular state of discussion not its end” (p 120). In the end, drifting is in itself, the end of all critique. One can understand the difference between the Sophists and Plato/Socrates by their view of man. The Sophist viewed man as an individual and the universal man was fiction. They were fascinated by ever-shifting (drifting) scenes of human life, especially public life (124). Vitanza furthers explains the Third Sophistic by stating, “The notion of a ‘Third Sophistic,’ as I espouse here, can be more accurately understood according to the topoi of “antecedent and consequent” rather than “cause and effect,” and according to ‘parataxis’ rather than ‘hypotaxis’” (128). Vitanza (1991) asks, “what is this drifting ‘add up to?’ (I’m sure pun intended with the ‘counting’). Aristotle is a philosopher, Lacan is a newer Sophist, but both are historiographers concerned with the “stories” of history. These stories tell us the world as it is, the Real. Language – constituted by Real. Lacan calls a “lie”, “lying truth”, “history” or “hystorization” resistant to theory (130).

 

All of these works tied together for me in Vitanza’s (1997), Negation, subjectivity, and the history of rhetoric. Vitanza speaks of Schiappa’s theory that rhetoric is fiction and Schiappa, like Plato, rejects the “mirage” in favor of the real thing. Vitanza’s groundbreaking paper correlates the danger of Schiappa’s argument to diminish and then exclude “the Sophists” and “sophistic rhetoric” to the theory that the holocaust didn’t exist. Vitanza immediately recognized that throughout history, there has always been a problem regarding what to do with the “Other”. Similar to individuals of Jewish heritage, the Sophists are considered “Others”. As part of this “Others” group, their work is misrepresented, ignored or worse….deemed non-existent. I had a lightbulb moment when Vitanza states that he is “laying the un/ground work, or the conditions, for rethinking the Sophists after Schiappa has systematically excluded them or re-described them as mere “fictions” (37)[11]. All of the readings then clicked into place, like a complex puzzle I was trying to solve. How did I not realize this before? Justhow dangerous it is for Schiappa to erase the Sophists from history, similar to what others have tried to do with the Holocaust.

 

Vitanza (1997) outlines Lyotard’s work in In The Differendand the differences between a differend and litigation. A differend is an argument between two parties that can’t be equitably solved. The legitimacy of one person’s argument does NOT imply the other’s lack of legitimacy. They key difference is that we have rules to settle litigation, but we don’t have rules for settling a differend (37). Lyotard cites examples of historians that claim they tried, in vain, to find evidence of the holocaust. Lyotard then goes on to say that the victims were “silenced, by the very rules of evidence that were specifically designed to allow them to speak in their defense, (38). This rang true for me as I thought about how many instances there are of victim shaming in today’s society. The rules we use to protect women from sexual abuse end up being the very rules that silence them.

 

Vitanza (1997) uses the clever play on words “Genus-cide”to articulate what Schiappa has done to the Sophists. He has tried to “kill off” an entire class of philosophers who have contributed to the theories we use today (54). Vitanza then urges historians to “write” histories, understanding what is at stake and we should question everything. I love this sentiment. We should always question and not take information at face value. Harking back to last week, we learned that we grow and learn from the conflict. Vitanza also brings us back to last weeks’ readings with his ending quote of the Dionysian’s Prayer by Kenneth Burke. He states that in contrast to Burke’s plea to have “neither the mania of One/Nor the delirium of the many” (1966, 65), we should go on and on and perpetually hold information into question.

 

LoFaro’s (2009) dissertation, she translates an essay by Mario Untersteiner ―Le origini sociali della

sofistical (―The Social Origins of Sophistry), which has never been published in English, and she explores its

significance in terms of classical and contemporary rhetorical theory (1). Throughout her dissertation she provides an introduction, background and scholarship of the sophists, a translation of the essay and interpretation of the importance of this translation to rhetorical history. When summarizing her work she says, “My main point is that what the sophists taught, rhetoric, is not in itself good or evil. Much like food, drugs, television, and any other substance or practice that can be abused, rhetoric comes to life and can be put to good or bad use” (182)[12]. I agree with this sentiment. I find it interesting that many of the works we’ve read thus far have mentioned the negative connotations with the word “rhetoric”. Rhetoric seems to have quite the bad reputation. However, I don’t see it that way. While rhetoric may be used for disingenuine purposes, it doesn’t mean those are the only uses. The other point that LoFaro (2009) makes that I felt was relevant and tied these works together was when she discussed how recently scholars have shifted the recovery of the sophists to Friedrich Nietzsche and Hegel. This ties in with what Vitanza stated about the “Third Sophistic”. She cites Vitanza’s work connecting Nietzsche and the

sophists. This helped tie together all of the readings and the connection with the “Third Sophistic”.

 

In conclusion, I think we can extend LoFaro’s point of view on rhetoric, not being good, bad or evil, to the scholars that we read on the topic of rhetoric itself and the readings this week. It’s important to not ignore work of scholars because we may not agree with their view. And their view may not be inherently “bad” or “evil”, but it will help us better understand the topic and hone our own viewpoint. Clearly, Schiappa and Poulakos don’t agree with my sentiment, as they sparred with increasingly more heat as their responses progressed. They didn’t seem to respect each other’s viewpoints nor acknowledge how they could both have valid points without negating their own argument (reflecting back to Lyotard’s The Differend). In the end, we, as scholars beginning this research on rhetoric have a responsibility to protect the integrity of the past while driving forward to the future.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Works Cited

 

LoFaro, E. (2009) A new understanding of sophistic rhetoric: A translation, with commentary, of Mario Untersteiner’s “Le origini sociali della sofistica”. University of South Florida Scholar Commons

 

O’Sullivan, N. (1993, Feb.). Plato and ἡϰαλουμένηῥητοριϰή. Mnemosyne, Fourth Series, 46(1). pp. 87-89: BRILLStable. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/4432222 .

 

Pendrick, G. (1998). Plato and PHTOPIKH. Rheinisches museum für philologie.141(H.1). Pp10-23. JD Sauerländers Verlag.

 

Poulakos, J. (1983). Toward a Sophistic Definition of Rhetoric. Philosophy & Rhetoric: 16: 1. Penn State University. pp. 35-48

 

Poulakos, J. (1990). Interpreting Sophistical Rhetoric: A Response to Schiappa. Philosophy & Rhetoric, 23(3), 218-228. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/40237636

 

Schiappa, E. (1990). History and Neo-Sophistic Criticism: A Reply to Poulakos. Philosophy & Rhetoric, 23( 4). Penn State University Press. pp. 307-315. Retrieved from

https://www.jstor.org/stable/40237647

 

Schiappa, E. (1990). Neo-Sophistic Rhetorical Criticism or the Historical Reconstruction of Sophistic Doctrines? Philosophy & Rhetoric, 23(3), 192-217. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/40237635

 

Schiappa, E. (1990) Did Plato Coin Rhetorike. The American Journal of Philology, 111, (4). pp. 457-470. The Johns Hopkins University Press. Retrieved from  http://www.jstor.org/stable/295241

 

Schiappa, E. (1991, Fall). Sophistic Rhetoric: Oasis or Mirage? Rhetoric Review, 10(1). pp5-18.

 

Vitanza, V.J. (1991) “Some More” Notes, Toward a “Third” Sophistic. Argumentation, 5: 117. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00054001.

 

Vitanza, V. J. (1997). Negation, subjectivity, and the history of rhetoric. Albany: State University of New York Press.

 

 

[1]Poulakos, J. (1983). Toward a Sophistic Definition of Rhetoric. Philosophy & Rhetoric: 16: 1. Penn State University. pp. 35-48

 

[2]Schiappa, E. (1990) Did Plato Coin Rhetorike. The American Journal of Philology, 111, (4). pp. 457-470. The Johns Hopkins University Press. Retrieved from  http://www.jstor.org/stable/295241

 

[3]Pendrick, G. (1998). Plato and PHTOPIKH. Rheinisches museum für philologie. 141(1). Pp. 10-23: JD Sauerländers Verlag.

 

[4]O’Sullivan, N. (1993, Feb.). Plato and ἡϰαλουμένηῥητοριϰή. Mnemosyne, Fourth Series, 46(1). pp. 87-89: BRILLStable. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/4432222 .

 

[5]Schiappa, E. (1990). Neo-Sophistic Rhetorical Criticism or the Historical Reconstruction of Sophistic Doctrines? Philosophy & Rhetoric, 23(3), 192-217. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/40237635

 

[6]Schiappa, E. (1990). Neo-Sophistic Rhetorical Criticism or the Historical Reconstruction of Sophistic Doctrines? Philosophy & Rhetoric, 23(3), 192-217. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/40237635

 

[7]Poulakos, J. (1990). Interpreting Sophistical Rhetoric: A Response to Schiappa. Philosophy & Rhetoric, 23(3), 218-228. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/40237636

[8]Schiappa, E. (1990). History and Neo-Sophistic Criticism: A Reply to Poulakos. Philosophy & Rhetoric, 23(4), 307-315. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/40237647

 

[9]Schiappa, E. (1991, Fall). Sophistic Rhetoric: Oasis or Mirage? Rhetoric Review, 10(1). pp5-18.

[10]Vitanza, V.J. (1991). “Some More” Notes, Toward a “Third” Sophistic. Argumentation,5(117). Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00054001

 

[11]Vitanza, V. J. (1997). Negation, subjectivity, and the history of rhetoric. Albany: State University of New York Press.

 

[12]LoFaro, E. (2009) A new understanding of sophistic rhetoric: A translation, with commentary, of Mario

Untersteiner’s “Le origini sociali della sofistica”. University of South Florida Scholar Commons.

Notes -Platonic Drama and its Ancient Reception

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Platonic Drama and its Ancient Reception

Charalabopoulos

By Stacy Cacciatore

Nikos G. Charalabopoulos, Platonic Drama and its Ancient

Reception. Cambridge classical studies. Cambridge; New York:

Cambridge University Press, 2012. Pp. xxi, 331. ISBN

It is quite likely, as many scholars have suggested, that Plato used performance of his dialogues as a teaching tool in the Academy but there is very little evidence of any specific kind for ancient performances of Plato

Charalabopoulos takes us on an interesting journey through the issues, but he

struggles to make a compelling case.

He claims that it is not “improper” to use Plato for our own particular

agenda, but only if “the reading will bring us closer to Plato and not vice versa”

In the fourth and final chapter, Charalabopoulos promises to evoke “the unknown story of Plato the playwright”.

Notes – The homoerotics of the Phaedrus

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The homoerotics of the Phaedrus

Page duBois

 

  • “Plato’s Phaedrus, as a text of high seduction, aimed at drawing the reader toward erotic life and therefore toward philosophy, plays with the edges of the Greek definitions of male and female to liberate the reader to a paradoxical sense of the fluidity of boundaries,” (p 9)
  • Calls Plato’s work logocentric
  • Derrida sees Plato in his emphasis on truth, presence and speaking, as aware of yet caught in the same contradiction as all thinkers who follow him.
  • “He insists on truth of the living voice, yet writes, insists on the living presence of Socrates, yet writes only after Socrates’ death.” (p 9)
  • “Furthermore and wrongly, I think, Derrida describes what he sees as an exclusively masculine lineage of philosophy, a phallocentric model of philosophical discourse, where the inheritance of dialectic passes patrilineally, from father to son” (9)
  • Female in Phaedrus as another pharmakon, a supplemental whom Plato delicately controls and appropriates in order to center on the male and thus a homoerotic model for philosophy
  • Plato’s text plays erotically with boundaries, with edges of space
  • “Plato uses the tension between the sexes in Greek culture, perhaps to assert the authority of the male at the scene of philosophy, but that his own desire to reconcile male and female makes that resolution a very provisional one,” (p 10).
  • The Phaedrus is a text of seduction
  • Socrates – two discourses – designed to seduce his companion Phaedrus
  • Logical method Socrates advocates – polymorphously erotic dimension
  • Logical-
  • Possibility of connection between reader-writer
  • Erotic play Phaedrus – relations between men
  • Excludes women
  • ThePhaedrus (/ˈfiːdrəs/; Ancient Greek: Φαῖδρος,  ‘Phaidros’), written by Plato, is a dialogue between Plato’s protagonist, Socrates, and Phaedrus, an interlocutor in several dialogues. The Phaedrus was presumably composed around 370 BC, about the same time as Plato’s Republic and Symposium.[1] Although ostensibly about the topic of love, the discussion in the dialogue revolves around the art of rhetoric and how it should be practiced, and dwells on subjects as diverse as metempsychosis (the Greek tradition of reincarnation) and erotic love.
  • Misogyny in Plato – consistent with his class
  • According to Timaeus, women are only created after the first generation of men “prove themselves cowardly and “unjust” and are “born again” as women
  • Male as A female as not A
  • Attempt to establish boundaries

opposite, to enantion (262b) is put into question as

suspect in the dialogue. But Plato’s text provisionally unites man and man,

and man and woman, in an erotic gesture which teases the reader, which uses

the repressed impulses of Greek male sexual identity, the desire to be the

  • female,apparently in order to cleanse the masculine soul of such impulses.
  • Socrates plays with erection and growth of wings, “and as the nourishment, streams upon

he, the quills of the feathers swell and begin to grow from the roots over all the form of the soul” (251 a-b).

  • Androgyny
  • Mother’s milk – ejaculatory stream – causes buds to sprout
  • Image of the chariot – Parmedies
  • Greek culture – repressive to women –
  • Socrates – in line of poets from Homer –
  • “Socrates’ delicate, literate gesture towards transvestism – belongs to a pattern of the Greek male’s fascination with and imitation of the socially suppressed female other,” (13)
  • “The mimesis of the female in the Phaedrus is perhaps a way of implicitly suggesting again the theme of intercourse between Socrates and Phaedrus by establishing a difference between them, one displaced from the erastes/eromenos difference, since both presumably are erasti” (13)
  • Erastes (Ancient Greece), an adult male in a relationship with an adolescent boy, also known as the philetor
  • Eromenos – (historical) An adolescent boy in Ancient Greece who was courted by an older man, or was in an erotic relationship with him.
  • Erasti – lover
  • Garden metaphors
  • Imagery Demeter, goddess of grain, of cereals, of fruitful human increase
  • Women’s sexual organs to be plowed by her husband, a metaphor, a metaphor from Oedipus Rex. The imagery of fruitful field characteristically used only of women, crosses the sexes once again (14)
  • Contains sperma, seed
  • Philosopher erotically implants his seed, his words, in the soul of the beloved,
  • Plato seductively uses the boundary between male and female, between homoerotic relationship among men and heterosexual intercourse. (p14)
  • Imagery – homosexual and heterosexual is an aphrodisiac motion
  • “Plato uses Socrates as a lure for the reader, who will conceive a desire for the older philosopher at his loveliest, carried off to the heavens in his vision of the good.”
  • “Plato is the pander for philosophy, making all readers Socrates’ erastai” (p 14)
  • The Greek titleErastai is the plural form of the term erastēs, which refers to the older partner in a pederastic relationship.
  • Plato plays with mimesis, distance, motherhood and the hypocrisy of absence.
  • He uses pharmakon and pharmakos

Preplatonic Philosophers

by

Stacy Cacciatore

220px-Parmenides

 

 

To understand Plato and Socrates, we must first understand the philosophers that came before them. At first, I was confused at the difference between the terms “Presocratics” and “Pre-platonics”. Nietzsche coined the term, “Preplatonics” because he posited that Plato was the first philosopher that included components of the other philosophers that came before him in his doctrine. Nietzsche states, “Plato himself is the first mixed type on a grand scale,” (p. 38).  Plato incorporated views from Socrates, Pythagoras and Herclitus, into his doctrine thereby helping us understand the history and components of philosophy that led us to where we are today. Nietzsche posits that those who followed Plato had an easier time philosophizing, as those prior to Plato, (Preplatonics), had to drive a path from myth to laws of nature, religion and science, which was more difficult to pave that original pathway. In Nietzsche’s Tragic Age of Greeks,I was surprised at how fond Nietzsche was of Herclitus. He called him the “star devoid of atmosphere” (p. 70) and he also did not believe in the popular opinion that Herclitus was obscure on purpose. Kofman (1987) compared and contrasted the viewpoints regarding Herclitus being named “The Obscure” by his own contemporaries to understand whyhe was this way (p. 39). Kofman (1987) states that the most “simplistic” theory on why Herclitus was obscure is that he is being obscure on purpose because he was a scornful man with a bad temper. Nietzshe, however, disagrees. Nietzsche did not believe that Herclitus was obscure on purpose. He uses the analogy “the ass which prefers straw to gold” (Kofman, p. 41) to articulate that if man doesn’t understand Herclitus, it’s because he’s stupid, not because Herclitus is obscure. Hegel believes that Herclitus is not obscure, but speculative. He thinks that Hegel’s obscurity is pseudo, only to enhance understanding of the being and non-being (p. 43). For Hegel, to translate Herclitus’ work is to “reduce the son’s language to that of the father,” which he calls the Aufhebung(p. 44). He elevates Herclitus’ meaning to “being is becoming”. Aristotle Believes Herclitus is obscure because of his paratactic vs. syntactic style; bad grammar (carelessness of punctuation). He also believes that Heraclitus’ obscurity shouldn’t be attributed to either Herclitus nor to his readers, but rather to the distortion between two types of forces, two points of view, two senses of taste or smell which can’t “stand” (smell) each other. The concluding question is “do we have to choose between those two ears?” Meaning, must we take sides? The difference in ear makes us understand language in a different way. My question is, don’t these different “ears” / perspectives help us enhance our understanding? Maybe there isn’t one single truth. Nietzsche is particularly relevant and one to pay attention to, as he is the first man, and according to Heidegger (1968), the only man, to recognize clearly and think through metaphysically ALL its implications (p. 57). I’m not sure about that, but I’m sure we will explore this assertion in the weeks to come.

Speaking of Nietzsche, he stated something that I think is particularly relevant, which is the fact that we don’t have the full works of many of these philosophers, only fragments (Babich, 1). Nietzsche posits that we often view Plato and Aristotle more favorably because we simply have more of their works. Nietzsche also states that we should read the philosophers work as “what philosophy was for them” versus what seems right to us. I find this particularly interesting because when I read about the “fragments” of work, I was actually quite surprised, as I didn’t’ realize previously that we didn’t have these philosophers works in whole, rather we were literally piecing together fragments of papyrus to form what we think they meant.

 

I found the book, Parmenides by Heideggar, extremely difficult to read and it took hours for me to just get through a few pages. The phrase, “It’s all Greek to me” popped in my head many times as I tried to decipher the Greek terminology and meanings. I took detailed notes, but since this was the first book I read, I didn’t have much context. Heideggar uses a method of dissecting language to reveal their primordial truth and “dismantling” traditional approaches of metaphysics (Encyclopedia Britannica). Heideggar (1998) explores what Parmenidesmeant by truth, “ἀλήθεια”. His conjecture is that “truth” is unconcealedness. But what “unconcealedness” means can be debated. Heideggar goes full circle with the definitions and interpretations of “truth” all the way from “unconcealedness”, “veiling”, “non-dissemblance”, “masking and covering up”, “conserving”, “preserving”, “entrusting”, “appropriating”, “resistance”, “closing”, “covering” and” justice” (p. 53). Depending upon how one defines “truth” and “unconcealedness” the truth can be any of these things. Heideggarsays, “Unconcealedness suggest “opposition” to “concealedness” (p. 20). But the opposite of unconcealedness is not concealedness but falsity. In today’s society, we consider “false” to be a negative view, but Heideggar states that “not every false assertion is an erroneous one,” (p. 29). I can relate this to conversations I have with my kids. My kids may say, “Fortnight is the best game ever made”. For them, that is an accurate statement and for many kids their age, this is also true. But, given I’m a bit (ahem) older, I believe that Super Mario Brothers is the best video game. If I say, “Fortnight isn’t the best game, Super Mario Brothers is,” that may not be an erroneous statement, but it’s a false assertion. This statement isn’t true for everyone, but it is for a subset of the population.

The other interesting component I learned about Paramedies, was in Rickert’s (2014)Paramedies, Ontologial Enaction and the Prehistory of Rhetoric, in which he posits that Paramedies deserves a significant place in rhetorical history (473). He also discusses how Paramedies was not only a philosopher, but a healer of sorts, who used altered states of consciousness, in caves, in his approach. Rickert also claims that Paramedies was the “first true philosopher” based on his work “On Being” (475). Our very own, VV, is mentioned in this article, along with other scholars, in viewing Paramedies as a logician and “philosophical precursor to Plato and often as a foil for more sophistic figures, such as Herclitus or Gorgias (476).

I particularly like when Heidegger (1998) speaks about “signs” as a mode of concealing. A sign is hiding something. For example, if I put a picture on the wall to hide a hole. But Heideggar makes an excellent point when he says, “The sign, in appearing itself, lets something else appear (p 107). Take, for example, the turning of a leaf from bright green to shades of purple, orange and yellow. This is a sign that the leaves have stopped their food-making process and the chlorophyll has broken down, causing the green color to appear. But the leaves changing colors also is a sign that fall is coming. To me, it’s also a sign that the pumpkin spice latte is coming back to Starbucks, my favorite fall festival is coming up, the apples are ripe for picking at the orchard and it’s almost time to carve our pumpkin. This is also my “truth” (ἀλήθεια), as for those who live in Florida, the same signs don’t appear nor mean the same thing. The essence of  truth for “fall is coming” is different and while stating “when the leaves change colors, it means fall is coming” is not necessarily true, it’s not erroneous either.

Reading Heideggar (1998) prepared me for reading about the Preplatonics in Presocratic Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction by Osborne. First Osborne (2011) walks us through what is meant by “fragments” which I wasn’t aware of previously. I didn’t realize that the works of these infamous philosophers has literally been pieced together by professionals. Alain Martin, of Brussels University, pieced together fragments from Empedocles papyrus to make sense of his poetry (7). I can’t imagine the amount of work that must have gone into deciphering each and every word that was found, piecing it together, researching who said it and what it meant. But that is exactly what these researchers did to help us understand what the Presocratics meant with their ancient philosophical ideas. Osborne provides us with a timeline of the Presocratic Philosophers and Plato and Aristotle to show the dates of their writing and teaching. This was extremely helpful in helping me understand how each of the philosopher influenced each other and how the ideas expanded upon the other. All of the philosophers ask the fundamental question, “what is the world made of?” The two basic principles are, “everything is in flux” and “infinite plurality of things” They also believe that everything in the world is made up of the same “stuff”, but they disagree on what that “stuff” is. They call this the “arche” (2012, Introduction to the Presocratics). “Everyone wanted to explain, as he thought best, how the world, as we know it now, could have originated from some single undifferentiated matter, (Osborne 29). These Presocratics also had differences in how they thought of the relationship of “being”.

I watched several of the videos by Academy of Ideason the Presocratic philosophers. I greatly enjoyed the videos because, when partnered with the readings, they helped bring some of the philosophers to life. They began the series with a discussion of the “Milesians”, which includes Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes. Thales was the first philosopher and he believed the ‘arche’ was water. Anaximander was a student of Thales and believed in ‘Apeiron’ “The unlimited”. Anaximenes believed the arche was “air” (Academy of Ideas, 2012).

Herclitus believed the arche was fire (Osborne 35). He had a reputation for misanthropy and obscurity. He spoke ill of other philosophers and thought people were dumb sheep and stupid like cattle. He said that people basically are sleepwalking through life and have no insight. Which, is seen in today’s time as well. When I think about this statement about “sheep” and “cattle” I think about how society gets distracted from the fundamental issues this world is facing and instead goes along with the crowd on what the “hot topic” of the month is. Whether it’s a political bandwagon or an obsession with Kylie Jenner’s new fashion line, people are sheep and follow the issues that they are told are important. Herclitus believed in a single divine law of universe – logos rules. He also felt that most people are bad, few are good (27). Moving on to another Preplatonic philosopher, Empedocles was the first philosopher to name the four elements (fire, water, earth and air) (13). He was born in Sicily in 492 and followed Paramedies. He was a crazy character and was described as flamboyant and he dressed ostentatiously and claimed magical powers. One time he even jumped into Mt. Etna, claimed he was immortal (Waterfield, 2009).

Paramedies is one of the most controversial philosophers and he believed in “one single undivided whole and nothing ever changes,” (Osborne 31). “Empedocles’ main theme was to proclaim that the world was both many and one, sometimes one and sometimes many in an endless cycle of change, (35). In contrast, Paramedies believes that nothing changes. The different beliefs of the Presocratics Philosophers can best be summed up with Paramedies said that, “opinions are just opinions, and they may differ widely” and “To search for knowledge is to search for access to the truth, not to collect other people’s opinions,” (50). Herclitus talks about how reality varies depending upon perspective. For example, the sea water is both pure and impure. For fish, sea water is drinkable and healthy, but for humans, it’s undrinkable and deadly. Paramedies was a student of Xenophanes but didn’t follow him, he is known for saying, “I searched myself”, indicating that he wasn’t a student of anyone except his own self.  He wrote in didactic poem (Waterfield, 2009).

There are three things that really stuck out while reading Presocraticphilosophy: A very short introduction  by Osborne (2011). First, the statement that there is no point in being good if no one is looking because society does little to help “goody goodies” Antiphon goes on to say, “it was always better to seize opportunities to act unfairly and steal the advantage,” (120). Wow, that is an impactful statement. I can certainly see that many people in the corporate world feel this way. After almost 20 years in the financial services industry, I’ve certainly seen my fair share of folks who definitely only do good if there is a spotlight on them or if it benefits them in some way. It’s interesting to see that this school of thought has been around for quite some time.

The second thing that struck me was what Protagoras said, “Man is the measure of all things,” (122). I certainly see this as well. We (humans) are all pretty selfish in my opinion. We all filter everything, what matters, what doesn’t, what is “truth”, what is “false” through our own perception and experience. Reality is all a perception, based on our own human experiences.

The third thing that struck me was what Gorgia said, “You don’t blame a woman for being raped by force. So why blame a person who is convinced by sweet talking?” (126). I found it extremely surprising that a philosopher compared being persuaded in the same camp as a woman being raped. This is a violent comparison, in which he’s basically saying that letting someone persuade you is as invasive as rape. That’s a pretty bold statement.

In conclusion, the readings this week greatly enhanced my ability to better understand the Preplatonic / Presocratic philosophers and their thoughts. They key is tying all of this information together to form a holistic picture of the Presocratic/Preplatonic philosophers. I put together a matrix of the different philosophers to better understand their beliefs and how they influenced each other. It’s challenging to keep al the information straight on the differences between them, so I’m hoping this helps me with the “who’s who” of the Preplatonic philosophers.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Works cited

 

A Philology for the Future Anterior.” Theorizing Histories of Rhetoric. Ed. Michelle Ballif. Carbondale: SIUP, 2013. 172-89.

Academy of Ideas. (2012, Nov. 11). Introduction to the Presocrates. [Video file] Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZkMAx04jDx0&t=14s

Academy of Ideas (2012, Nov. 23). Introduction to Thales, Anaximenes, and Anaximander. [Video file] Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iyUWeoPc1wg

Babich, B. (2018, June 17). Nietsche’s Preplatonic Philosophers: Diogenes Laertis, ‘Personality,’ and the ‘Succession’ of Anaxagoras. Fordham University, NYC, USA.

Encyclopedia Britannica, online. “Heidegger, Martin.” https://www.britannica.com/biography/Martin-Heidegger-German-philosopher (accessed August 28, 2018).

Heidegger, M., Schuwer, A., & Rojcewixz, R. (1998) Parmenides. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Heidegger, M. (1968). What is called thinking. New York: Harper & Row.

Kofman, S., & Lionnet-Mccumber, F. (1987). Nietzsche and the Obscurity of Heraclitus. Diacritics, 17(3), 39-55. doi:10.2307/464834

Osborne, C. (2011). Presocraticphilosophy: A very short introduction. New York: Oxford University Press.

Rickert, T. (2014). Parmenides, Ontological Enaction and the Prehistory of Rhetoric. Philosophy & Rhetoric, 47(4), 472.

Waterfield, R. (2009). Thefirst philosophers the Presocratics and Sophists. Oxford: Oxford University Press.