{"id":449,"date":"2019-04-23T01:23:05","date_gmt":"2019-04-23T01:23:05","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/stacycacciatore.com\/?p=449"},"modified":"2019-04-23T01:23:05","modified_gmt":"2019-04-23T01:23:05","slug":"the-sophists","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/stacycacciatore.com\/index.php\/2019\/04\/23\/the-sophists\/","title":{"rendered":"The Sophists"},"content":{"rendered":"<h1><strong>The Sophists<\/strong><\/h1>\n<h3><em>By Stacy Cacciatore<\/em><\/h3>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/stacycacciatore.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/04\/sophists.jpeg\"><img fetchpriority=\"high\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"aligncenter size-full wp-image-450\" src=\"https:\/\/stacycacciatore.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/04\/sophists.jpeg\" alt=\"\" width=\"196\" height=\"257\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<p>The readings this week centered on the exploration of the Sophists and the debate regarding if they existed, if they did exist, what did they stand for, and why it matters. Schiappa and Poulakos engage in a fiery debate on the topic of Sophists and they go back in forth in several papers refuting each other\u2019s arguments. Poulakos (1983) strongly believes \u201c\u2026without the Sophists, our picture of the rhetoric that came out of the Greek experience is incomplete\u201d(35)<a href=\"applewebdata:\/\/4F29F6B8-AD33-49AA-8CA6-0466418401BA#_ftn1\" name=\"_ftnref1\">[1]<\/a>. In his essay, <em>Toward a Sophistic Definition of Rhetoric, <\/em>Poulakos applauds the Sophists for their contribution to rhetoric and Greek culture and history. He defines the characteristics of the Sophists, who he says, \u201cas a group, the Sophists are known to have been the first to say or do a number of things (44). This presupposes that the Sophists, as a group, have common characteristics. He states, \u201cthe \u2018sophistic\u2019 definition of rhetoric is founded on and consistent with the notions of rhetoric as art, style as personal expression, the timely, the appropriate, and the possible. This definition posits that man is driven primarily by his desire to be other, the wish to move from the sphere of actuality to that of possibility (45). This is an important statement about the theory of rhetoric that the Sophists developed.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>Schiappa (1990), however, strongly disagrees. He states that Plato was the first to use the term rhetoric, making it impossible for the Sophists to have clearly conceptualized this term<a href=\"applewebdata:\/\/4F29F6B8-AD33-49AA-8CA6-0466418401BA#_ftn2\" name=\"_ftnref2\">[2]<\/a>. He provides evidence supporting his claim that there was a lack of attestation of the term in fifth- and fourth-century texts prior to Gorgias. However, Pendrick (1998) found fault in Schiappa\u2019s logic, relating to how he defined rhetoric. He states, \u201cPart of the difficulty with Schiappa&#8217;s position is terminological. Following George Kennedy, he distinguishes two senses of the word &#8216;rhetoric&#8217;: (1) persuasive speaking or oratory; and (2) rhetorical theory or &#8220;conceptual or meta-rhetoric that attempts to theorize about oratory,\u201d (11)<a href=\"applewebdata:\/\/4F29F6B8-AD33-49AA-8CA6-0466418401BA#_ftn3\" name=\"_ftnref3\">[3]<\/a>. This rebuttal inserts weakness into Schiappa\u2019s argument. O\u2019Sullivan (1993) also doesn\u2019t agree with Schiappa\u2019s claims that Plato was the first to use the word \u2018rhetoric\u2019<a href=\"applewebdata:\/\/4F29F6B8-AD33-49AA-8CA6-0466418401BA#_ftn4\" name=\"_ftnref4\">[4]<\/a>. He brings up an extremely interesting point, which is that the lack of the word \u2018rhetoric\u2019 in 5<sup>th<\/sup>century texts is not an effective argument, as there is almost a total disappearance of all the writings of the Sophists. As we learned previously, the majority of the work of the Sophists exists in fragments. Therefore, we don\u2019t have a full picture of the terms they used.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>Schiappa (1990) writes another paper stressing the difference between <em>appreciating<\/em>sophistic thinking as a contribution to contemporary theory and developing \/ reconstructing sophistic theories or doctrines (192)<a href=\"applewebdata:\/\/4F29F6B8-AD33-49AA-8CA6-0466418401BA#_ftn5\" name=\"_ftnref5\">[5]<\/a>. (As VV would say, the emphasis in italics is mine). Schiappa fires back at Poulakos, saying basically that while many of his works are \u201cpraiseworthy examples of neo-sophistic rhetorical criticism\u201d, this back-handed compliment is couched with the caveat that his work requires correction \u201cif viewed from the standpoint of historical reconstruction\u201d (198). He is basically saying that while the work of the Sophists can be appreciated, there is a historically significant difference between the early sophistic efforts, which pontificate theories about the world and how it works, and the later efforts that are a part of clearly conceptualized \u201cart of rhetoric\u201d.\u00a0 This phrase \u201cart\u201d is also important to note because Poulakos claims that rhetoric = art, but Schiappa states that \u201cart of rhetor\u201d didn\u2019t occur until the 4<sup>th<\/sup>century. This isn\u2019t the only argument that Schiappa uses in disputing Poulakos\u2019 claims. He also discusses how one cannot classify the Sophists as \u201chighly accomplished linguistic craftsmen\u201d as Poulakos does. Rather, that is how everyone spoke back then\u2026in this rhythmic fashion. Therefore, it\u2019s doesn\u2019t mean anything significant to claim this is a \u201cSophist style\u201d when in fact, it was the style of the time. Schiappa states that there is no single doctrine of theory of any subject for the Sophists. He then goes out to define the style of each of the Sophists individually, which also becomes a hot button between Schiappa and Poulakos. Poulakos claims that Schiappa is ridiculous for saying that the Sophists can only be studied independently because he is contradicting himself. First, he says that they can\u2019t be defined, then he says, well they can, but they are different. Schiappa (1990) defined the Sophists as follows:<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Protagoras \u2013 Dissoi Logoi<\/li>\n<li>Gorgias \u2013 Logos as Apate<\/li>\n<li>Prodicus \u2013 Orthoepeia<\/li>\n<li>Hippias \u2013 Polymathy<\/li>\n<li>Antiphon \u2013 Logos as Cure or Escape<\/li>\n<li>Critias \u2013 Logos of Thought<\/li>\n<li>Thrasymachus \u2013 Logos and Power <a href=\"applewebdata:\/\/4F29F6B8-AD33-49AA-8CA6-0466418401BA#_ftn6\" name=\"_ftnref6\">[6]<\/a>(212)<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>Poulakos (1990) then responds back to Schiappa in a journal article, articulating his clear frustration with Schiappa. He states, \u201cSchiappa has no case, if he did have a case it could not be supported and even if it could be supported, it would be useless,\u201d (219)<a href=\"applewebdata:\/\/4F29F6B8-AD33-49AA-8CA6-0466418401BA#_ftn7\" name=\"_ftnref7\">[7]<\/a>. I had to laugh at this for its\u2019 metaphysical nihilism characteristics. Poulakos comes back strong in this argument, claiming \u201cSchiappa creates false dichotomy between those who know the \u201cfacts\u201d (historians and philologists) and those who don\u2019t\u201d (221). He also calls out Schiappa for basing his entire argument on the fact that the term rhetoric can\u2019t be found in the ancient texts because Schiappa didn\u2019t explain how he arrived at those facts (222). Poulakos then provides several artifacts of evidence demonstrate where and when he found the usage of the word \u2018rhetoric\u2019, including an Aesop tale from early 6<sup>th<\/sup>century B.C. He goes on to state that just because Schiappa can\u2019t see the common themes and relationship between the Sophists, doesn\u2019t mean that it doesn\u2019t exist.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>Schiappa (1990) responds again to Poulakos. He summarizes his previous argument, \u201cLast issue I argued that scholarship concerning Sophists can benefit by acknowledging the difference between historical and rational reconstructions. The former is recovering Sophistic Doctrines based on historical evidence. The latter contributes to construction of a contemporary \u201cneosophistic\u201d theory and criticism of rhetoric\u201d (p 307)<a href=\"applewebdata:\/\/4F29F6B8-AD33-49AA-8CA6-0466418401BA#_ftn8\" name=\"_ftnref8\">[8]<\/a>. Schiappa called Poulakos\u2019 work \u201cneo-sophistic\u201d because of his \u201csophistic definition of rhetoric\u201d (p 307). Schiappa stated, \u201cWe are all trapped in the present and all \u201chistory\u201d is merely a reflection of the historian\u2019s values and biases\u201d (p 307). I completely agree that history is biased and cannot be separated from the historian\u2019s own viewpoints and beliefs. I don\u2019t think it\u2019s conscious, but we are human and I think it\u2019s human nature to filter information through our own experience, similar to what we learned last week in the study on the frog\u2019s brain framing reality based on his biology. I also agree with Schiappa that there is not one single \u201cfinal\u201d or \u201cobjective\u201d or \u201cimpersonal\u201d historical account.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>In Schiappa\u2019s <a name=\"_Toc525318847\"><\/a>(1991)<em>Sophistic Rhetoric: Oasis or Mirage?<\/em>He states that Poulakos developed a \u201csophistic definition of rhetoric\u201d (5)<a href=\"applewebdata:\/\/4F29F6B8-AD33-49AA-8CA6-0466418401BA#_ftn9\" name=\"_ftnref9\">[9]<\/a>. He also claims that Sophistic rhetoric only exists because we want to see it, it\u2019s just a \u201cmirage\u201d (5). He also believes that it is impossible to come up with a \u201chistorically defensible definition of \u201csophistic rhetoric\u201d that is nontrivial and uniquely valuable,\u201d (5). Not only does Schiappa not believe in \u201csophistic rhetoric\u201d, he doesn\u2019t believe we even know who they are. He states that the usage of the term \u201csophist\u201d was loosely defined in ancient times and while Plato denoted a group of individuals in the 5<sup>th<\/sup>century B.C. (Gorgias, Protagoras, Hippias, Prodicus, Thrasymachus, Critias and Antiphon), the list was arbitrary (7). He states:<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>It is clear that we cannot identify a defining characteristic of \u201cthe sophists\u201d that allows us to narrow the group to a degree sufficient to adduce a common perspective or set of practices. Either we treat the term as broadly as did the ancient Greeks, in which case almost every serious thinking must be included, or we are forced to pick a trait that serves no useful function other than to confirm some preconceived preference. Any account of \u201csophistic rhetoric\u201d will tend to beg the question because it will presuppose who should be called a \u201csophist\u201d \u2013 a determination which must be made on doctrinal grounds. The circularity of the reasoning seems to be unavoidable and is part of the reason \u201csophistic rhetoric\u201d should be considered a mirage. (p 8)<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>He goes on to say that sophistic rhetoric is largely fiction and superfluous. He also claims that Plato invented sophistic rhetoric for his own needs and we no longer need to maintain this fiction (16). I was shocked when I read this, as this is quite a bold statement. I was confused at the point on Plato creating rhetoric for his own \u201cends\u201d, as he doesn\u2019t explain what those \u201cends\u201d are.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><a name=\"_Toc525318848\"><\/a>In our very own Victor Vitanza\u2019s (1991) paper, \u201c<em>Some More\u201d Notes, Toward a \u201cThird\u201d Sophistic<\/em>he makes the point that there is a third Sophistic. Vitanza posits that the three Sophistics\u2019 are not necessarily sequential. Each have representation, including Protagoras for the first Sophistic, Aeschines for the second Sophistic and Gorgias (among others, including Nietzshe, Lyotard and Foucault) represent the third. Vitanza uses the method of \u201ccounting\u201d to differentiate between the three Sophist groups. To summarize, Aristotle counts to \u201cone\u201d, the Sophists count to \u201ctwo\u201d and Gorgias, et al count to \u201cmany things\u201d (p 117)<a href=\"applewebdata:\/\/4F29F6B8-AD33-49AA-8CA6-0466418401BA#_ftn10\" name=\"_ftnref10\">[10]<\/a>. To further differentiate, Vitanza defines the timeframes for each of the Sophistics:<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Third Sophistic\n<ul>\n<li>Ethics, politics, aesthetics, so-called unhappy considerations<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li>First Sophistic\n<ul>\n<li>5<sup>th<\/sup>century BC<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li>Second Sophistic\n<ul>\n<li>2<sup>nd<\/sup>century AD (118)<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>Vitanza (1991) questions, \u201cwith whom will I drift\u201d asking the philosophical question of where his philosophical roots reside, which he answers as the third Sophistic (121). He is not only against Platonism, Hegelianism, but also against any form of Aristotelianism. While the notion behind the Platonic\/Socratic notion is linked to physis (nature) Sophistic is linked to nomos (law, convention, custom) (123). Lyotard says, \u201cconsensus finally does violence to the heterogeneity of language games,\u201d (p 120). Vitanza\u2019s response to this is \u201c[C]onsensus is only a particular state of discussion not its end\u201d (p 120). In the end, drifting is in itself, the end of all critique. One can understand the difference between the Sophists and Plato\/Socrates by their view of man. The Sophist viewed man as an individual and the universal man was fiction. They were fascinated by ever-shifting (drifting) scenes of human life, especially public life (124). Vitanza furthers explains the Third Sophistic by stating, \u201cThe notion of a \u2018Third Sophistic,\u2019 as I espouse here, can be more accurately understood according to the topoi of \u201cantecedent and consequent\u201d rather than \u201ccause and effect,\u201d and according to \u2018parataxis\u2019 rather than \u2018hypotaxis\u2019\u201d (128). Vitanza (1991) asks, \u201cwhat is this drifting \u2018add up to?\u2019 (I\u2019m sure pun intended with the \u2018counting\u2019). Aristotle is a philosopher, Lacan is a newer Sophist, but both are historiographers concerned with the \u201cstories\u201d of history. These stories tell us the world as it is, the Real. Language \u2013 constituted by Real. Lacan calls a \u201clie\u201d, \u201clying truth\u201d, \u201chistory\u201d or \u201chystorization\u201d resistant to theory (130).<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>All of these works tied together for me in Vitanza\u2019s (1997), <em>Negation, subjectivity, and the history of rhetoric<\/em>. Vitanza speaks of Schiappa\u2019s theory that rhetoric is fiction and Schiappa, like Plato, rejects the \u201cmirage\u201d in favor of the real thing. Vitanza\u2019s groundbreaking paper correlates the danger of Schiappa\u2019s argument to diminish and then exclude &#8220;the Sophists&#8221; and &#8220;sophistic rhetoric&#8221; to the theory that the holocaust didn\u2019t exist. Vitanza immediately recognized that throughout history, there has always been a problem regarding what to do with the \u201cOther\u201d. Similar to individuals of Jewish heritage, the Sophists are considered \u201cOthers\u201d. As part of this \u201cOthers\u201d group, their work is misrepresented, ignored or worse\u2026.deemed non-existent. I had a lightbulb moment when Vitanza states that he is \u201claying the un\/ground work, or the conditions, for rethinking the Sophists after Schiappa has systematically excluded them or re-described them as mere \u201cfictions\u201d (37)<a href=\"applewebdata:\/\/4F29F6B8-AD33-49AA-8CA6-0466418401BA#_ftn11\" name=\"_ftnref11\">[11]<\/a>. All of the readings then clicked into place, like a complex puzzle I was trying to solve. How did I not realize this before? <em>Just<\/em>how dangerous it is for Schiappa to erase the Sophists from history, similar to what others have tried to do with the Holocaust.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>Vitanza (1997) outlines Lyotard\u2019s work in In <em>The Differend<\/em>and the differences between a differend and litigation. A differend is an argument between two parties that can\u2019t be equitably solved. The legitimacy of one person\u2019s argument does NOT imply the other\u2019s lack of legitimacy. They key difference is that we have rules to settle litigation, but we don\u2019t have rules for settling a differend (37). Lyotard cites examples of historians that claim they tried, in vain, to find evidence of the holocaust. Lyotard then goes on to say that the victims were \u201csilenced, by the very rules of evidence that were specifically designed to allow them to speak in their defense, (38). This rang true for me as I thought about how many instances there are of victim shaming in today\u2019s society. The rules we use to protect women from sexual abuse end up being the very rules that silence them.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>Vitanza (1997) uses the clever play on words \u201c<em>Genus-cide\u201d<\/em>to articulate what Schiappa has done to the Sophists. He has tried to \u201ckill off\u201d an entire class of philosophers who have contributed to the theories we use today (54). Vitanza then urges historians to \u201cwrite\u201d histories, understanding what is at stake and we should <em>question everything<\/em>. I love this sentiment. We should always question and not take information at face value. Harking back to last week, we learned that we grow and learn from the conflict. Vitanza also brings us back to last weeks\u2019 readings with his ending quote of the Dionysian\u2019s Prayer by Kenneth Burke. He states that in contrast to Burke\u2019s plea to have \u201cneither the mania of One\/Nor the delirium of the many\u201d (1966, 65), we should go on and on and perpetually hold information into question.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>LoFaro\u2019s (2009) dissertation, she translates an essay by Mario Untersteiner \u2015Le origini sociali della<\/p>\n<p>sofistical (\u2015The Social Origins of Sophistry), which has never been published in English, and she explores its<\/p>\n<p>significance in terms of classical and contemporary rhetorical theory (1). Throughout her dissertation she provides an introduction, background and scholarship of the sophists, a translation of the essay and interpretation of the importance of this translation to rhetorical history. When summarizing her work she says, \u201cMy main point is that what the sophists taught, rhetoric, is not in itself good or evil. Much like food, drugs, television, and any other substance or practice that can be abused, rhetoric comes to life and can be put to good or bad use\u201d (182)<a href=\"applewebdata:\/\/4F29F6B8-AD33-49AA-8CA6-0466418401BA#_ftn12\" name=\"_ftnref12\">[12]<\/a>. I agree with this sentiment. I find it interesting that many of the works we\u2019ve read thus far have mentioned the negative connotations with the word \u201crhetoric\u201d. Rhetoric seems to have quite the bad reputation. However, I don\u2019t see it that way. While rhetoric may be used for disingenuine purposes, it doesn\u2019t mean those are the only uses. The other point that LoFaro (2009) makes that I felt was relevant and tied these works together was when she discussed how recently scholars have shifted the recovery of the sophists to Friedrich Nietzsche and Hegel. This ties in with what Vitanza stated about the \u201cThird Sophistic\u201d. She cites Vitanza\u2019s work connecting Nietzsche and the<\/p>\n<p>sophists. This helped tie together all of the readings and the connection with the \u201cThird Sophistic\u201d.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>In conclusion, I think we can extend LoFaro\u2019s point of view on rhetoric, not being good, bad or evil, to the scholars that we read on the topic of rhetoric itself and the readings this week. It\u2019s important to not ignore work of scholars because we may not agree with their view. And their view may not be inherently \u201cbad\u201d or \u201cevil\u201d, but it will help us better understand the topic and hone our own viewpoint. Clearly, Schiappa and Poulakos don\u2019t agree with my sentiment, as they sparred with increasingly more heat as their responses progressed. They didn\u2019t seem to respect each other\u2019s viewpoints nor acknowledge how they could both have valid points without negating their own argument (reflecting back to Lyotard\u2019s <em>The Differend<\/em>). In the end, we, as scholars beginning this research on rhetoric have a responsibility to protect the integrity of the past while driving forward to the future.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>Works Cited<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>LoFaro, E. (2009) A new understanding of sophistic rhetoric: A translation, with commentary, of Mario Untersteiner&#8217;s &#8220;Le origini sociali della sofistica&#8221;. University of South Florida Scholar Commons<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>O&#8217;Sullivan, N. (1993, Feb.). Plato and \u1f21\u03f0\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u1fe5\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u03b9\u03f0\u03ae. <em>Mnemosyne, Fourth Series<\/em>, <em>46<\/em>(1). pp. 87-89: BRILLStable. Retrieved from http:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/4432222 .<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>Pendrick, G. (1998). Plato and PHTOPIKH. Rheinisches museum f\u00fcr philologie.141(H.1). Pp10-23. JD Sauerl\u00e4nders Verlag.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>Poulakos, J. (1983). Toward a Sophistic Definition of Rhetoric. <em>Philosophy &amp; Rhetoric<\/em>: <em>16<\/em>: 1. Penn State University. pp. 35-48<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>Poulakos, J. (1990). Interpreting Sophistical Rhetoric: A Response to Schiappa. Philosophy &amp; Rhetoric, 23(3), 218-228. Retrieved from <a href=\"http:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/40237636\">http:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/40237636<\/a><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>Schiappa, E. (1990). History and Neo-Sophistic Criticism: A Reply to Poulakos. <em>Philosophy &amp; Rhetoric, 23<\/em>( 4). Penn State University Press. pp. 307-315. Retrieved from<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/40237647\">https:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/40237647<\/a><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>Schiappa, E. (1990). Neo-Sophistic Rhetorical Criticism or the Historical Reconstruction of Sophistic Doctrines? Philosophy &amp; Rhetoric, 23(3), 192-217. Retrieved from <a href=\"http:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/40237635\">http:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/40237635<\/a><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>Schiappa, E. (1990) Did Plato Coin Rhetorike. <em>The American Journal of Philology<\/em>, <em>111<\/em>, (4). pp. 457-470. The Johns Hopkins University Press. Retrieved from\u00a0 <a href=\"http:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/295241\">http:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/295241<\/a><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>Schiappa, E. (1991, Fall). Sophistic Rhetoric: Oasis or Mirage<em>? Rhetoric Review, 10<\/em>(1). pp5-18.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>Vitanza, V.J. (1991) &#8220;Some More&#8221; Notes, Toward a &#8220;Third&#8221; Sophistic. <em>Argumentation<\/em>, <em>5<\/em>: 117. Retrieved from <a href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/BF00054001\">https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/BF00054001<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>Vitanza, V. J. (1997). Negation, subjectivity, and the history of rhetoric. Albany: State University of New York Press.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"applewebdata:\/\/4F29F6B8-AD33-49AA-8CA6-0466418401BA#_ftnref1\" name=\"_ftn1\">[1]<\/a>Poulakos, J. (1983). Toward a Sophistic Definition of Rhetoric. <em>Philosophy &amp; Rhetoric<\/em>: <em>16<\/em>: 1. Penn State University. pp. 35-48<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"applewebdata:\/\/4F29F6B8-AD33-49AA-8CA6-0466418401BA#_ftnref2\" name=\"_ftn2\">[2]<\/a>Schiappa, E. (1990) Did Plato Coin Rhetorike. <em>The American Journal of Philology<\/em>, <em>111<\/em>, (4). pp. 457-470. The Johns Hopkins University Press. Retrieved from\u00a0 <a href=\"http:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/295241\">http:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/295241<\/a><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"applewebdata:\/\/4F29F6B8-AD33-49AA-8CA6-0466418401BA#_ftnref3\" name=\"_ftn3\">[3]<\/a>Pendrick, G. (1998). Plato and PHTOPIKH. <em>Rheinisches museum f\u00fcr philologie<\/em>. <em>141<\/em>(1). Pp. 10-23: JD Sauerl\u00e4nders Verlag.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"applewebdata:\/\/4F29F6B8-AD33-49AA-8CA6-0466418401BA#_ftnref4\" name=\"_ftn4\">[4]<\/a>O&#8217;Sullivan, N. (1993, Feb.). Plato and \u1f21\u03f0\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u1fe5\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u03b9\u03f0\u03ae. <em>Mnemosyne, Fourth Series<\/em>, <em>46<\/em>(1). pp. 87-89: BRILLStable. Retrieved from http:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/4432222 .<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"applewebdata:\/\/4F29F6B8-AD33-49AA-8CA6-0466418401BA#_ftnref5\" name=\"_ftn5\">[5]<\/a>Schiappa, E. (1990). Neo-Sophistic Rhetorical Criticism or the Historical Reconstruction of Sophistic Doctrines?\u00a0<em>Philosophy &amp; Rhetoric,<\/em>\u00a0<em>23<\/em>(3), 192-217. Retrieved from http:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/40237635<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"applewebdata:\/\/4F29F6B8-AD33-49AA-8CA6-0466418401BA#_ftnref6\" name=\"_ftn6\">[6]<\/a>Schiappa, E. (1990). Neo-Sophistic Rhetorical Criticism or the Historical Reconstruction of Sophistic Doctrines? <em>Philosophy &amp; Rhetoric<\/em>, <em>23<\/em>(3), 192-217. Retrieved from http:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/40237635<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"applewebdata:\/\/4F29F6B8-AD33-49AA-8CA6-0466418401BA#_ftnref7\" name=\"_ftn7\">[7]<\/a>Poulakos, J. (1990). Interpreting Sophistical Rhetoric: A Response to Schiappa. Philosophy &amp; Rhetoric, 23(3), 218-228. Retrieved from http:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/40237636<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"applewebdata:\/\/4F29F6B8-AD33-49AA-8CA6-0466418401BA#_ftnref8\" name=\"_ftn8\">[8]<\/a>Schiappa, E. (1990). History and Neo-Sophistic Criticism: A Reply to Poulakos.\u00a0<em>Philosophy &amp; Rhetoric,<\/em>\u00a0<em>23<\/em>(4), 307-315. Retrieved from http:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/40237647<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"applewebdata:\/\/4F29F6B8-AD33-49AA-8CA6-0466418401BA#_ftnref9\" name=\"_ftn9\">[9]<\/a>Schiappa, E. (1991, Fall). Sophistic Rhetoric: Oasis or Mirage<em>? Rhetoric Review, 10<\/em>(1). pp5-18.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"applewebdata:\/\/4F29F6B8-AD33-49AA-8CA6-0466418401BA#_ftnref10\" name=\"_ftn10\">[10]<\/a>Vitanza, V.J. (1991). \u201cSome More\u201d Notes, Toward a \u201cThird\u201d Sophistic. <em>Argumentation<\/em>,<em>5<\/em>(117). Retrieved from <a href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/BF00054001\">https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/BF00054001<\/a><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"applewebdata:\/\/4F29F6B8-AD33-49AA-8CA6-0466418401BA#_ftnref11\" name=\"_ftn11\">[11]<\/a>Vitanza, V. J. (1997).\u00a0<em>Negation, subjectivity, and the history of rhetoric<\/em>. Albany: State University of New York Press.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"applewebdata:\/\/4F29F6B8-AD33-49AA-8CA6-0466418401BA#_ftnref12\" name=\"_ftn12\">[12]<\/a>LoFaro, E. (2009) A new understanding of sophistic rhetoric: A translation, with commentary, of Mario<\/p>\n<p>Untersteiner&#8217;s &#8220;Le origini sociali della sofistica&#8221;. University of South Florida Scholar Commons.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>The Sophists By Stacy Cacciatore The readings this week centered on the exploration of the Sophists and the debate regarding if they existed, if they did exist, what did they stand for, and why it matters. Schiappa and Poulakos engage in a fiery debate on the topic of Sophists and they go back in forth&#8230;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":450,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[28,3,69],"tags":[73,5,71,17,70,72],"class_list":["post-449","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-essays","category-ph-d-digital-portfolio","category-sophists","tag-lyotard","tag-plato","tag-poulakos","tag-rhetoric","tag-schiappa","tag-sophists"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/stacycacciatore.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/449","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/stacycacciatore.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/stacycacciatore.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/stacycacciatore.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/stacycacciatore.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=449"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/stacycacciatore.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/449\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":451,"href":"https:\/\/stacycacciatore.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/449\/revisions\/451"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/stacycacciatore.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/450"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/stacycacciatore.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=449"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/stacycacciatore.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=449"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/stacycacciatore.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=449"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}