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The Sophists

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The Sophists

By Stacy Cacciatore

The readings this week centered on the exploration of the Sophists and the debate regarding if they existed, if they did exist, what did they stand for, and why it matters. Schiappa and Poulakos engage in a fiery debate on the topic of Sophists and they go back in forth in several papers refuting each other’s arguments. Poulakos (1983) strongly believes “…without the Sophists, our picture of the rhetoric that came out of the Greek experience is incomplete”(35)[1]. In his essay, Toward a Sophistic Definition of Rhetoric, Poulakos applauds the Sophists for their contribution to rhetoric and Greek culture and history. He defines the characteristics of the Sophists, who he says, “as a group, the Sophists are known to have been the first to say or do a number of things (44). This presupposes that the Sophists, as a group, have common characteristics. He states, “the ‘sophistic’ definition of rhetoric is founded on and consistent with the notions of rhetoric as art, style as personal expression, the timely, the appropriate, and the possible. This definition posits that man is driven primarily by his desire to be other, the wish to move from the sphere of actuality to that of possibility (45). This is an important statement about the theory of rhetoric that the Sophists developed.

 

Schiappa (1990), however, strongly disagrees. He states that Plato was the first to use the term rhetoric, making it impossible for the Sophists to have clearly conceptualized this term[2]. He provides evidence supporting his claim that there was a lack of attestation of the term in fifth- and fourth-century texts prior to Gorgias. However, Pendrick (1998) found fault in Schiappa’s logic, relating to how he defined rhetoric. He states, “Part of the difficulty with Schiappa’s position is terminological. Following George Kennedy, he distinguishes two senses of the word ‘rhetoric’: (1) persuasive speaking or oratory; and (2) rhetorical theory or “conceptual or meta-rhetoric that attempts to theorize about oratory,” (11)[3]. This rebuttal inserts weakness into Schiappa’s argument. O’Sullivan (1993) also doesn’t agree with Schiappa’s claims that Plato was the first to use the word ‘rhetoric’[4]. He brings up an extremely interesting point, which is that the lack of the word ‘rhetoric’ in 5thcentury texts is not an effective argument, as there is almost a total disappearance of all the writings of the Sophists. As we learned previously, the majority of the work of the Sophists exists in fragments. Therefore, we don’t have a full picture of the terms they used.

 

Schiappa (1990) writes another paper stressing the difference between appreciatingsophistic thinking as a contribution to contemporary theory and developing / reconstructing sophistic theories or doctrines (192)[5]. (As VV would say, the emphasis in italics is mine). Schiappa fires back at Poulakos, saying basically that while many of his works are “praiseworthy examples of neo-sophistic rhetorical criticism”, this back-handed compliment is couched with the caveat that his work requires correction “if viewed from the standpoint of historical reconstruction” (198). He is basically saying that while the work of the Sophists can be appreciated, there is a historically significant difference between the early sophistic efforts, which pontificate theories about the world and how it works, and the later efforts that are a part of clearly conceptualized “art of rhetoric”.  This phrase “art” is also important to note because Poulakos claims that rhetoric = art, but Schiappa states that “art of rhetor” didn’t occur until the 4thcentury. This isn’t the only argument that Schiappa uses in disputing Poulakos’ claims. He also discusses how one cannot classify the Sophists as “highly accomplished linguistic craftsmen” as Poulakos does. Rather, that is how everyone spoke back then…in this rhythmic fashion. Therefore, it’s doesn’t mean anything significant to claim this is a “Sophist style” when in fact, it was the style of the time. Schiappa states that there is no single doctrine of theory of any subject for the Sophists. He then goes out to define the style of each of the Sophists individually, which also becomes a hot button between Schiappa and Poulakos. Poulakos claims that Schiappa is ridiculous for saying that the Sophists can only be studied independently because he is contradicting himself. First, he says that they can’t be defined, then he says, well they can, but they are different. Schiappa (1990) defined the Sophists as follows:

 

  • Protagoras – Dissoi Logoi
  • Gorgias – Logos as Apate
  • Prodicus – Orthoepeia
  • Hippias – Polymathy
  • Antiphon – Logos as Cure or Escape
  • Critias – Logos of Thought
  • Thrasymachus – Logos and Power [6](212)

 

 

Poulakos (1990) then responds back to Schiappa in a journal article, articulating his clear frustration with Schiappa. He states, “Schiappa has no case, if he did have a case it could not be supported and even if it could be supported, it would be useless,” (219)[7]. I had to laugh at this for its’ metaphysical nihilism characteristics. Poulakos comes back strong in this argument, claiming “Schiappa creates false dichotomy between those who know the “facts” (historians and philologists) and those who don’t” (221). He also calls out Schiappa for basing his entire argument on the fact that the term rhetoric can’t be found in the ancient texts because Schiappa didn’t explain how he arrived at those facts (222). Poulakos then provides several artifacts of evidence demonstrate where and when he found the usage of the word ‘rhetoric’, including an Aesop tale from early 6thcentury B.C. He goes on to state that just because Schiappa can’t see the common themes and relationship between the Sophists, doesn’t mean that it doesn’t exist.

 

Schiappa (1990) responds again to Poulakos. He summarizes his previous argument, “Last issue I argued that scholarship concerning Sophists can benefit by acknowledging the difference between historical and rational reconstructions. The former is recovering Sophistic Doctrines based on historical evidence. The latter contributes to construction of a contemporary “neosophistic” theory and criticism of rhetoric” (p 307)[8]. Schiappa called Poulakos’ work “neo-sophistic” because of his “sophistic definition of rhetoric” (p 307). Schiappa stated, “We are all trapped in the present and all “history” is merely a reflection of the historian’s values and biases” (p 307). I completely agree that history is biased and cannot be separated from the historian’s own viewpoints and beliefs. I don’t think it’s conscious, but we are human and I think it’s human nature to filter information through our own experience, similar to what we learned last week in the study on the frog’s brain framing reality based on his biology. I also agree with Schiappa that there is not one single “final” or “objective” or “impersonal” historical account.

 

In Schiappa’s (1991)Sophistic Rhetoric: Oasis or Mirage?He states that Poulakos developed a “sophistic definition of rhetoric” (5)[9]. He also claims that Sophistic rhetoric only exists because we want to see it, it’s just a “mirage” (5). He also believes that it is impossible to come up with a “historically defensible definition of “sophistic rhetoric” that is nontrivial and uniquely valuable,” (5). Not only does Schiappa not believe in “sophistic rhetoric”, he doesn’t believe we even know who they are. He states that the usage of the term “sophist” was loosely defined in ancient times and while Plato denoted a group of individuals in the 5thcentury B.C. (Gorgias, Protagoras, Hippias, Prodicus, Thrasymachus, Critias and Antiphon), the list was arbitrary (7). He states:

 

It is clear that we cannot identify a defining characteristic of “the sophists” that allows us to narrow the group to a degree sufficient to adduce a common perspective or set of practices. Either we treat the term as broadly as did the ancient Greeks, in which case almost every serious thinking must be included, or we are forced to pick a trait that serves no useful function other than to confirm some preconceived preference. Any account of “sophistic rhetoric” will tend to beg the question because it will presuppose who should be called a “sophist” – a determination which must be made on doctrinal grounds. The circularity of the reasoning seems to be unavoidable and is part of the reason “sophistic rhetoric” should be considered a mirage. (p 8)

 

He goes on to say that sophistic rhetoric is largely fiction and superfluous. He also claims that Plato invented sophistic rhetoric for his own needs and we no longer need to maintain this fiction (16). I was shocked when I read this, as this is quite a bold statement. I was confused at the point on Plato creating rhetoric for his own “ends”, as he doesn’t explain what those “ends” are.

 

In our very own Victor Vitanza’s (1991) paper, “Some More” Notes, Toward a “Third” Sophistiche makes the point that there is a third Sophistic. Vitanza posits that the three Sophistics’ are not necessarily sequential. Each have representation, including Protagoras for the first Sophistic, Aeschines for the second Sophistic and Gorgias (among others, including Nietzshe, Lyotard and Foucault) represent the third. Vitanza uses the method of “counting” to differentiate between the three Sophist groups. To summarize, Aristotle counts to “one”, the Sophists count to “two” and Gorgias, et al count to “many things” (p 117)[10]. To further differentiate, Vitanza defines the timeframes for each of the Sophistics:

 

  • Third Sophistic
    • Ethics, politics, aesthetics, so-called unhappy considerations
  • First Sophistic
    • 5thcentury BC
  • Second Sophistic
    • 2ndcentury AD (118)

 

Vitanza (1991) questions, “with whom will I drift” asking the philosophical question of where his philosophical roots reside, which he answers as the third Sophistic (121). He is not only against Platonism, Hegelianism, but also against any form of Aristotelianism. While the notion behind the Platonic/Socratic notion is linked to physis (nature) Sophistic is linked to nomos (law, convention, custom) (123). Lyotard says, “consensus finally does violence to the heterogeneity of language games,” (p 120). Vitanza’s response to this is “[C]onsensus is only a particular state of discussion not its end” (p 120). In the end, drifting is in itself, the end of all critique. One can understand the difference between the Sophists and Plato/Socrates by their view of man. The Sophist viewed man as an individual and the universal man was fiction. They were fascinated by ever-shifting (drifting) scenes of human life, especially public life (124). Vitanza furthers explains the Third Sophistic by stating, “The notion of a ‘Third Sophistic,’ as I espouse here, can be more accurately understood according to the topoi of “antecedent and consequent” rather than “cause and effect,” and according to ‘parataxis’ rather than ‘hypotaxis’” (128). Vitanza (1991) asks, “what is this drifting ‘add up to?’ (I’m sure pun intended with the ‘counting’). Aristotle is a philosopher, Lacan is a newer Sophist, but both are historiographers concerned with the “stories” of history. These stories tell us the world as it is, the Real. Language – constituted by Real. Lacan calls a “lie”, “lying truth”, “history” or “hystorization” resistant to theory (130).

 

All of these works tied together for me in Vitanza’s (1997), Negation, subjectivity, and the history of rhetoric. Vitanza speaks of Schiappa’s theory that rhetoric is fiction and Schiappa, like Plato, rejects the “mirage” in favor of the real thing. Vitanza’s groundbreaking paper correlates the danger of Schiappa’s argument to diminish and then exclude “the Sophists” and “sophistic rhetoric” to the theory that the holocaust didn’t exist. Vitanza immediately recognized that throughout history, there has always been a problem regarding what to do with the “Other”. Similar to individuals of Jewish heritage, the Sophists are considered “Others”. As part of this “Others” group, their work is misrepresented, ignored or worse….deemed non-existent. I had a lightbulb moment when Vitanza states that he is “laying the un/ground work, or the conditions, for rethinking the Sophists after Schiappa has systematically excluded them or re-described them as mere “fictions” (37)[11]. All of the readings then clicked into place, like a complex puzzle I was trying to solve. How did I not realize this before? Justhow dangerous it is for Schiappa to erase the Sophists from history, similar to what others have tried to do with the Holocaust.

 

Vitanza (1997) outlines Lyotard’s work in In The Differendand the differences between a differend and litigation. A differend is an argument between two parties that can’t be equitably solved. The legitimacy of one person’s argument does NOT imply the other’s lack of legitimacy. They key difference is that we have rules to settle litigation, but we don’t have rules for settling a differend (37). Lyotard cites examples of historians that claim they tried, in vain, to find evidence of the holocaust. Lyotard then goes on to say that the victims were “silenced, by the very rules of evidence that were specifically designed to allow them to speak in their defense, (38). This rang true for me as I thought about how many instances there are of victim shaming in today’s society. The rules we use to protect women from sexual abuse end up being the very rules that silence them.

 

Vitanza (1997) uses the clever play on words “Genus-cide”to articulate what Schiappa has done to the Sophists. He has tried to “kill off” an entire class of philosophers who have contributed to the theories we use today (54). Vitanza then urges historians to “write” histories, understanding what is at stake and we should question everything. I love this sentiment. We should always question and not take information at face value. Harking back to last week, we learned that we grow and learn from the conflict. Vitanza also brings us back to last weeks’ readings with his ending quote of the Dionysian’s Prayer by Kenneth Burke. He states that in contrast to Burke’s plea to have “neither the mania of One/Nor the delirium of the many” (1966, 65), we should go on and on and perpetually hold information into question.

 

LoFaro’s (2009) dissertation, she translates an essay by Mario Untersteiner ―Le origini sociali della

sofistical (―The Social Origins of Sophistry), which has never been published in English, and she explores its

significance in terms of classical and contemporary rhetorical theory (1). Throughout her dissertation she provides an introduction, background and scholarship of the sophists, a translation of the essay and interpretation of the importance of this translation to rhetorical history. When summarizing her work she says, “My main point is that what the sophists taught, rhetoric, is not in itself good or evil. Much like food, drugs, television, and any other substance or practice that can be abused, rhetoric comes to life and can be put to good or bad use” (182)[12]. I agree with this sentiment. I find it interesting that many of the works we’ve read thus far have mentioned the negative connotations with the word “rhetoric”. Rhetoric seems to have quite the bad reputation. However, I don’t see it that way. While rhetoric may be used for disingenuine purposes, it doesn’t mean those are the only uses. The other point that LoFaro (2009) makes that I felt was relevant and tied these works together was when she discussed how recently scholars have shifted the recovery of the sophists to Friedrich Nietzsche and Hegel. This ties in with what Vitanza stated about the “Third Sophistic”. She cites Vitanza’s work connecting Nietzsche and the

sophists. This helped tie together all of the readings and the connection with the “Third Sophistic”.

 

In conclusion, I think we can extend LoFaro’s point of view on rhetoric, not being good, bad or evil, to the scholars that we read on the topic of rhetoric itself and the readings this week. It’s important to not ignore work of scholars because we may not agree with their view. And their view may not be inherently “bad” or “evil”, but it will help us better understand the topic and hone our own viewpoint. Clearly, Schiappa and Poulakos don’t agree with my sentiment, as they sparred with increasingly more heat as their responses progressed. They didn’t seem to respect each other’s viewpoints nor acknowledge how they could both have valid points without negating their own argument (reflecting back to Lyotard’s The Differend). In the end, we, as scholars beginning this research on rhetoric have a responsibility to protect the integrity of the past while driving forward to the future.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Works Cited

 

LoFaro, E. (2009) A new understanding of sophistic rhetoric: A translation, with commentary, of Mario Untersteiner’s “Le origini sociali della sofistica”. University of South Florida Scholar Commons

 

O’Sullivan, N. (1993, Feb.). Plato and ἡϰαλουμένηῥητοριϰή. Mnemosyne, Fourth Series, 46(1). pp. 87-89: BRILLStable. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/4432222 .

 

Pendrick, G. (1998). Plato and PHTOPIKH. Rheinisches museum für philologie.141(H.1). Pp10-23. JD Sauerländers Verlag.

 

Poulakos, J. (1983). Toward a Sophistic Definition of Rhetoric. Philosophy & Rhetoric: 16: 1. Penn State University. pp. 35-48

 

Poulakos, J. (1990). Interpreting Sophistical Rhetoric: A Response to Schiappa. Philosophy & Rhetoric, 23(3), 218-228. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/40237636

 

Schiappa, E. (1990). History and Neo-Sophistic Criticism: A Reply to Poulakos. Philosophy & Rhetoric, 23( 4). Penn State University Press. pp. 307-315. Retrieved from

https://www.jstor.org/stable/40237647

 

Schiappa, E. (1990). Neo-Sophistic Rhetorical Criticism or the Historical Reconstruction of Sophistic Doctrines? Philosophy & Rhetoric, 23(3), 192-217. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/40237635

 

Schiappa, E. (1990) Did Plato Coin Rhetorike. The American Journal of Philology, 111, (4). pp. 457-470. The Johns Hopkins University Press. Retrieved from  http://www.jstor.org/stable/295241

 

Schiappa, E. (1991, Fall). Sophistic Rhetoric: Oasis or Mirage? Rhetoric Review, 10(1). pp5-18.

 

Vitanza, V.J. (1991) “Some More” Notes, Toward a “Third” Sophistic. Argumentation, 5: 117. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00054001.

 

Vitanza, V. J. (1997). Negation, subjectivity, and the history of rhetoric. Albany: State University of New York Press.

 

 

[1]Poulakos, J. (1983). Toward a Sophistic Definition of Rhetoric. Philosophy & Rhetoric: 16: 1. Penn State University. pp. 35-48

 

[2]Schiappa, E. (1990) Did Plato Coin Rhetorike. The American Journal of Philology, 111, (4). pp. 457-470. The Johns Hopkins University Press. Retrieved from  http://www.jstor.org/stable/295241

 

[3]Pendrick, G. (1998). Plato and PHTOPIKH. Rheinisches museum für philologie. 141(1). Pp. 10-23: JD Sauerländers Verlag.

 

[4]O’Sullivan, N. (1993, Feb.). Plato and ἡϰαλουμένηῥητοριϰή. Mnemosyne, Fourth Series, 46(1). pp. 87-89: BRILLStable. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/4432222 .

 

[5]Schiappa, E. (1990). Neo-Sophistic Rhetorical Criticism or the Historical Reconstruction of Sophistic Doctrines? Philosophy & Rhetoric, 23(3), 192-217. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/40237635

 

[6]Schiappa, E. (1990). Neo-Sophistic Rhetorical Criticism or the Historical Reconstruction of Sophistic Doctrines? Philosophy & Rhetoric, 23(3), 192-217. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/40237635

 

[7]Poulakos, J. (1990). Interpreting Sophistical Rhetoric: A Response to Schiappa. Philosophy & Rhetoric, 23(3), 218-228. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/40237636

[8]Schiappa, E. (1990). History and Neo-Sophistic Criticism: A Reply to Poulakos. Philosophy & Rhetoric, 23(4), 307-315. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/40237647

 

[9]Schiappa, E. (1991, Fall). Sophistic Rhetoric: Oasis or Mirage? Rhetoric Review, 10(1). pp5-18.

[10]Vitanza, V.J. (1991). “Some More” Notes, Toward a “Third” Sophistic. Argumentation,5(117). Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00054001

 

[11]Vitanza, V. J. (1997). Negation, subjectivity, and the history of rhetoric. Albany: State University of New York Press.

 

[12]LoFaro, E. (2009) A new understanding of sophistic rhetoric: A translation, with commentary, of Mario

Untersteiner’s “Le origini sociali della sofistica”. University of South Florida Scholar Commons.